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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT
OF THE STA-l'E OF UTAH
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vs.
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I

1

EDYVIN HOLT BUCK,
)
Defendant-Respondent and
Cross-Appellant.

10595

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for an annulment and to determine what the parties contributed to the acquisition of
the estate and to determine an equitable distribution
of the accumulated property.
1

DISPOSITION MADE OF THE CASE IN
THE LO,VER COURT
This case was tried before the Honorable Merrill
C. Faux, District Judge, sitting without a jury. At
the opening of the trial, the court granted the annulment based upon the decree theretofore rendered by
the Honorable Stewart 1\1. Hanson, District Judge,
and upon the stipulation of plaintiff and defendant.
The court then proceeded to hear four days of testi·
mony and two concluding arguments, together with
two subsequent arguments, on the law and the evi·
dence, held on the 28th day of October, 1965 (at the
instance of the court), and again on the 21st day
of December, 1965 (upon the motion of plaintiff).
The court then granted plaintiff the sum of $31,957.43,
less the sum of $7,214.00, received by plaintiff from
defendant in the year prior to judgment, viz. the sum
of $24,742.73, together with interest at 6% from the
16th day of October, 1964, to November 29, 1965.
The court determined that said sum was an equitabie
distribution of the property acquired through the joint
efforts of the plaintiff and defendant during their co·
habitation. Plaintiff appealed from the decision and
defendant cross-appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant seeks
a reduction in the amount awarded to plaintiff-appel·
2

Iant from the sum of $31,957.43 to not more than the
sum of $10,203.04 without interest.

STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS
In the early part of October, 1964, plaintiff left
defendant and the home where the parties had been
living for years and thereafter sued defendant for
divorce (Tr. 317). Defendant answered and then moved
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the ground that no
marriage existed. The motion was granted (Tr. I and
2), and a decree of annulment was entered, and the
matter came on to be heard on the 7th day of October,
1965. The only questions remaining to be determined
were: I) the amount contributed to the acquisition of
the property by each of the parties, and 2) an equitable
distribution of the property acquired during the cohabitation.
Plaintiff and defendant cohabited as man and wife
from the 17th day of March, 1945, to on or about the
18th day of October, 1964, when plaintiff absented
herself from the residence where the parties had been
living and did not return (Tr. 317).
Plaintiff was a divorcee with two children at the
time she purportedly married l\ilr. Buck and knew,
at the time of the purported marriage, that his divorce
was not final (Tr. 392) .
Appro~imately one year after the purported mar-

riage, in the spring of 1946, plaintiff and defendant
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moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, where Mr. Buck pur.
chased a beer tavern (Tr. 302-303). Shortly there.
after a lot was purchased, then a residence, shares 01
stock: a duplex and then the real property on whid
the tavern is located (Tr. 302-304). The acquisition
cost of all of this property was $108,200.88 (Tr. 307)
Defendant invested his inherited capital, together witi:
its increment, in the property. (Tr. 210, 215, 292-299).
Defendant managed and controlled all properti
and investments (Tr. 25, 305, 306, 405, 408, 323, 319).
and plaintiff, in addition to keeping house for herseli
and defendant, worked on some occasions at the tavern
(Tr. 118). Defendant cared for one of the children of
plaintiff at his home for a time (Tr. 175, 197), ana
provided employment for the husband (Ted Thorstead
of the other child of plaintiff (Tr. 314, 157).

1

Throughout the period of cohabitation, defendanl
provided plaintiff with a comfortable living above the
average (Tr. 118, 174-175, 337-338, 340-341). The
parties were able to and did live well above the average
Defendant-respondent and cross-appellant dis·
agrees with the statement of facts of plaintiff-appellan!
where it is said, "they purchased a tavern" (Tr. 301·
303); where it is stated that only the first small amounh
of stock purchased came from assets the defendant hao
at the time of the marriage and that thereafter money
for the stocks came from joint earnings (Tr. 210).
that "there was some small income received from the
California property" (Tr. 295-296, Ex. 15-D), the im·
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plication that the business was built by both of them,
and the implication that defendant depleted the estate
by his drinking, gambling and ownership of Cadillacs
--it is believed that the many parts of the evidence
referred to in the argument, infra, will prohibit any
credence being given to such an implication; that plaintiff has received only $6,909. 70 since she left defendant
(Tr. 256, 258, 261, 359) ; that defendant ever admitted
"waking up in Denver and not knowing how he got to
Denver."
Since the 18th day of October, 1964, the date
plaintiff left defendant, plaintiff has received from
defendant the sum of $7,214.00 (Tr. 256, 258, 261,
359 and the lower court's order of December 21, 1965).
POINT I. THE DISTRIBUTION IN
EQUITY ~1ADE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS EXCESSIVE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LA,V.
Under our law, the marriage relationship is one of
complete mutuality, and unless each party is wholly
and completely bound by marriage, neither party is
married nor in any way bound to the other. There are
no degrees of marriage.
Our court in Jenkins v . .T enkin.Y, 107 Utah 239,

153 P. 2d 262, said:

Under Section -i0-1-17, U.C.A. 1943, the court
clearly had _the au~hority to declare the purported marf!age v01d. 'Vhere the marriage has
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been entered into in good faith by both parties
or where, as here, both parties knew of the interlocutory. decree of divorce which had not yet be.
come final, the court in the exercise of its equit.
able power has jurisdiction to require an equitable distribution of the property acquired during
the time the litigants were cohabiting as man and
wife.
Although the court in the Jenkins case was not
called upon to decide what form an equitable distribution should take, some of the cases which it cited did
so, and in all of them from states where, (as in our
own), the common law is the general rule of decision,
the guidelines for solving the distribution of property
after a void marriage are set down.
These guidelines were set down in Fuller v. Fuller,
33 Kan. 582, 7 P. 241 (1885):
"It is our opinion, however, that in all judicial separations of persons who have lived to·
gether as husband and wife, a fair and equitable
division of their property should be had, and the
court in making such division should inquire into
the amount that each party originally owned,
the amount each party received while they wert
livin.g together, and the amount of their joinl
accumulations." (Emphasis supplied).

That the stated points of inquiry are the guideline1
is amply demonstrated by a long line of cases from
many jurisdictions from the date of the Fuller case
to the present. In all of these cases the contributiom
of the parties are scrutinized.

6

In the case of Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399,
53 P. 127 ( 1898), the court said:
\Vhile Emil Y\T erner had considerable property at the time of the marriage and Rosa had
none, the testimony tends to show that the property which they have now is largely the result
of their join labor and earnings. She was active,
industrious and faithful and besides household
work, she was an effici,ent aid in conducting and
carrying on the different branches of business in
which he was engaged. In the early days she
performed labor of the hardest and most menial
character and throughout the 22 years in which
they lived together as husband and wife she was
diligent, tireless and econornical in building up
a business and in gathering up the property
which they held at the time of the trial. She
appears to have been a valuable assistant in managing the business and in caring for the property in which their earnings were invested. A
portion of the time the title to the property was
in her name, but at the time of the separation
he held the legal title to most of it. The fact,
however, that the legal title stood in the name
of one or of the other of the parties does not
prevent a just distribution of the property
jointly contributed and in fact jointly owned by
both. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly it cannot be said of plaintiff in the case
here for decision that she was "active, industrious and
fatihful"; that "she was an efficient aid in conducting
anc] carrying on the different branches of business" in
which l\Ir. Buck was engaged. Nor, it is submitted,
does the record show her to be "diligent, tireless and
7

economical" or "a valuable assistant in managing the
business and in caring for the property in which * * *
earnings were invested." Alice Buck had no earnings
and invested no money in the property. The purported
Mrs. Buck did what she wanted to (Tr. 388). She
didn't earn money, she spent it. She didn't manage
the business, she used it. (Tr. 309, 311, 312.) She objected to the purchase of the tavern, and the realty
on which it is located (Tr. 238, 308).
In the case of Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash, 213,
96 P. 1079, 1082 (1908), the court found that the
plaintiff there had helped acquire and save the property
and said, " ... the court had authority to decree ...
the division of the property which has been jointl,Y
accumulated by the parties." (Emphasis supplied).
Alice Buck objected to the purchase of the business
(Tr. 308) and to the purchase of the realty on which
the business stands (Tr. 238) .
In the case of Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P.
441, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 844 (1911), the court held that
where the purported wife had contributed to the acqui·
sitions of the parties after marriage and before annul·
ment, she was entitled to a share. It is interesting to
note that the jurisdiction of the Coats case is one where
the common law is not the basis for general decision
for property rights acquired during a purported mar·
riage, and even then, the court adhered to the contribu·
tion theory.
In the case of Batty v. Green, (Mass.) 92 N.E. 715
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( 1910), the litigants made joint contributions to a fund

from which property \vas purchased, and the court found
that because of the joint contributions an equitable division would be had. A master determined the fractional
contributions of the parties to the whole and the award
was made on that basis. Again, it is to be noted that in
the Buck case there was no joint fund and plaintiffappellant Buck contributed no funds and that her contribution in \vork was small indeed compared to the contribution of l\Ir. Buck (Tr. 309, 316, 324-325).
Another Massachusetts case, Morin v. Kirkland, 115
N.E. 414 ( 1917) tells the story of a void marriage where
the plaintiff mingled her wages with the money she
received from the purported husband for household
expenses. Realty was purchased with this money and
upon the death of the purported husband, the court held
the property to be hers. Plaintiff-appellant Buck had
no wages, and mingled no funds (Tr. 39-40).

In re Brenchley, 96 Wash. 223, 164 P. 913 (1917),

<lepicted a situation where the purported wife kept
borders and a lodging house and was a nurse and a midwife and contributed her earnings to the payment of the
obligations which purchased the property which was the
subject for division. Because of the contributions she
made from her individual earnings, the court made an
award to the purported wife.

Knoll v. Knoll, 104 'iVash. 110, 176 P. 22 (1918).
Here the court found that the purported wife had faithfully performed all the duties of a housewife; she had

9

worked as a seamstress; she had provided for her ou,
expenses, and that the property was acquired by the
joint efforts of the parties, and the court held that if she
had not supported herself the husband would have hao
to do it. On such bases the court made its award. Tht
attention of the court is directed to the fact that not
only was plaintiff-appellant Buck supported by Mr.
Buck, but she was supported in a fashion well above tht
average; and. that plaintiff-appellant Buck had no out·
side employment.
11

Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okl. 30, 190 P. 1088 (19201.
In this case the court made an equitable division of tht
property where it was shown that at the time of tht
purported marriage the parties had no property bul
worked and toiled together for 15 years, saving aboui
$16,000 over and above their indebtedness. The court
also found that the woman assisted in accumulating the
property which was acquired by the savings of therr
joint efforts. Again, the court's attention is directed tu
the fact that at the inception of the purported Buel
marriage, Mr. Buck had substantial assets, his purportec
wife had none; and that such joint efforts there wert
were small indeed compared to the individual effort oi
Mr. Buck.
In the year 1921 another Washington case, Power'
v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 200 P. 1080, found that tni
purported wife had received in her own name a paten
to certain lands upon which she had filed a timber anr
stone claim. Because she had made a contribution to tDi
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acquisition of the property, the court allowed her such
portion of the property as to which she was equitably
and justly entitled.
An interesting void marriage case is that of Fung
Dai Kim Ah Leony v. Lau Ah Leong, (1928) (C.A.
9th Hawaii) 27 F.2d 582, Cert. den., 278 U.S. 636, 73
L. ed 552, 49 S.Ct. 33, wherein the plaintiff and a man
entered into a joint marriage. 'Vhen their association
began, the man was penniless. With money contributed
{Jy the woman a business was begun which resulted in the
accumulation of several hundred thousand dollars. The
court in setting out the formula for distribution said,
"Here, we think, it will be proper for the court . . .
to take into consideration the relative contributions of
property, and of personal service in point of value, made
by the two parties in the accumulation of the property
standing in the defendant's name, the amount and value
of such propert.11 at the time their defacto marital relationB ceased, the amount of property accumulated by
plaintiff during the same period and standing in her
name, ... " In the Fung Dai case the woman worked
long and hard and provided money for the man to get
his start. This, of course, is the diametric opposite of the
situation obtaining between ~Ir. Buck and his purported
wife.
The case of Reese v. Reese, 132 Kan. 438, 295 P.
690 ( 1931) was a case where the putative wife contributed funds previously given her in a property settlement,
and from an inheritance, which funds were directly chan-
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neled into the man's business ; s~he also assisted him in
other ways. On this state of facts the court made an
award to the woman based upon the amount of her
contributions. In the Reese case the contributions of
the woman were substantial, but in the Buck case, it is
submitted, they certainly do not meet such a test.

An Indiana case decided in 1942 was that of Sclamber v. Sclamber, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801, wherein,

at the time of the marriage, the court found the man had
$47,750 and owed $23,000. When the parties separated
11 years later, the man had $21,750 and owed $5,.500.
During this time the woman performed the usual dutie~
of a housewife, she was economical, and aided and
assisted the man in reducing his indebtedness by $17,450,
for which she received no compensation. The court said
she was entitled to equitable relief and gave her a judg·
ment of $1,000. In the Buck case the testimony is to the
effect that not only was plaintiff-appellant Buck well·
maintained, but that she was the consistent recipient of
large sums of money and the beneficiary of many trips.
The case of King v. Jackson, 196 Okl. 327, 164 P.2d
97 4 ( 1945) again leans heavily on the guidelines set
forth in the Fuller case. The court found the evidence
of the woman convincing to the effect that during most
of the time she had lived with her purported husband
she was actively employed as a teacher, worked as a
domestic and contributed most of her money toward
acquiring and improving the property in question. The
court decreed to her an award of one-half interest but
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impressed her judgment ·with an amount equal to onehalf the taxes paid by the defendant.
The case of Schwartz v. United States, (Maryland)
l!H F.2d 618 ( 1915), involved a situation wherein the
purported wife of a void marriage purchased with her
own rnone,11 land which was conveyed to her and her purported husband by a deed intended to convey an estate
by the entireties. Because of her total contribution, the
title to the land was impressed with a trust in her favor.
The California void marriage cases are interesting
because when they divide the property equally they do
so because they subscribe to a rule which denotes accumulated property as quasi-community property pursuant to the influence of the Spanish law. The case cited
by plaintiff-appellant, viz., Schneider v. Schneider, I83
Cal. 335, 191 P. 533, II A.L.R. I386 ( I920), is an
example. Earlier cases have based their decision on the
common law and the contribution theory of which Coats
,.. Coats, supra, is an example. The later California
('.ases do not subscribe to the equal division theory. Such
a case is that of Keene v. J(eene, 2I Cal. Rep. 593, 37I
P.2d 329 ( 1962). In addressing itself to the question of
what are joint contributions, or contributions sufficient
to entitle a woman to participate in a share of the property, the court in referring to Vallera v. Vallera, 2I
C.2d 681, I34 P.2d 76I, 763, said:
If a man and woman live together as husband
and wife under an agreement to pool their earnings and share equally in their joint accumula-
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tions, equity will protect the interests of each
in such property (citations). Even in the ab.
sence of an express agreement to that effect the
woman would be entitled to share in the prop.
erty jointly accumulated in the proportion that
her funds contributed towards acquisition (cita.
tions) ". (Emphasis supplied). ':Ve do not
depart from that proposition but here the
trial court found as stated in its memorandum
decision, "no evidence of financial contribu.
tions by plaintiff toward the property here concerned nor is there evidence sufficient to support any agreement upon which a joint enter·
prise or co-partnership could be based". In an
effort to bring her case nevertheless within the
purview of the just quoted language from
V allera, plaintiff stresses a finding of the trial
court concerning the nature of her services dur·
ing the period of co-habitation, and on this bas~
contends that in Vallera "When it used the wora
'funds' the court did not mean 'money' only.
It referred to any contribution made by the
woman, at least to any contribution other than
her services as a housekeeper, cook and home·
maker for which she may have been compensated
either wholly or in part by support furnished.
The contention is without merit. When a word
is used which has a well established meaning iu
common parlance such as "funds" the necessities
of intelligible communications require that it
be assumed that the user intended that common
meaning. There is no mystery surrounding the
word here mentioned questioned by plaintiff.
The dictionary defines it as "available pecuniary
resources ordinarily including cash and nego~
tiable paper", ('Vebsters New International
Dictionary 3rd Ed. 1961, page 921), and in a
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legal coutext the courts have also taken it to
include property of value which may be converted into cash (citing cases). A simple reading
of both the Yallera opinions demonstrates that
the members of the court intended and under&tood the word "funds" to be used in this common everyday sense. Indeed the dissenting
opinion in \T allera expressly stated it to be "the
conclusion of the majority opinion that in order
to sustain the judgment of the trial court, there
must be proof of a definite monetary contribution by the plaintiff in the form of separate
property or a contribution of her earnings as a
waitress or from other employment outside the
home." (Italics added) (Cases cited). Plaintiff's reliance on subsequent decisions of this
Court and the District Court of Appeal wl}~ch
cite Y all era is misplaced, as none extends the
beyond its intended, commonsense
word .'funds'
,,
meanmg.
Another recent case dealing with this problem is
that of Anderson t'. Stncker, ( ~Iissouri Report Offieially not published) 317 S."\V.2d 417 (1958). The court
there had under cons id era tion property which had been
conveyed to plaintiff and defendant as husband and
wife, although they were not married, and the decision
•ms that a tenancy in common ·was created. But since
there was no proof that the woman had contributed any
sum to the purchase price or to the payment of notes
secured by trust deeds on the property, the man was
entitled to judgment quieting title to the real property
in him, subject to an adjustment for repairs and improvements made by the woman. " ... Upon this record
it VW.IJ only be said in accordance with the general
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rule, that the trial court has f01.md and apportioned
the interests of the pm·ties proportionately to their
contributions to its acquisition. . . . Subject to an
adjustment for repairs and improvements, the judgment quieting the title to the real property in (the
man) is affirmed and remanded; . . . " ( Emphasi~
supplied). It is to be noted that in the Stacker case
the woman advanced some $300 for the purpose of improvements and repairs. In addition, she worked all
during the purported marriage at a job away from
home.
Some talk has been made by plaintiff-appellant
about the joint tenancy property. The plain answer to
this is to be found on pages 341-343 of the transcript.
The defendant said:
Q. Why are they in joint tenancy?

A. Well, I figured that Alice was my wife. She
kept-she always figured that she was (gypped)
in life and she was worried about that, if some·
thing happened to me, if she was going to get
what I had, and there was arguments-argu·
ments-so I decided to put these in her name;
but she never had any custody of them.
They were in the Savings-Deposit box in my
name ; all they were doing is protecting her in
case I would die; then, the Safety-Deposit box
be opened up and it could be given to her.
Q. Did you-were these stocks always in joint
tenancy?

A. To begin with, I bought them in my name:
not these, but others.
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Q. \Yas this a voluntary action on your part

that you put them in joint tenancy?

A. I would say not so, but I had to have peace
and quietness in the house.
Q. \Vhy wouldn't you have peace and quietness

in the house ?

A. She wanted protection in case I died; so,
to have peace and quietness, I gave her protection in case I died, by putting her name on my
stocks.
Q. \Vhat would she do when her name wasn't
on the stocks?

A. She would pout. I bought a couple of shares
of Budd and different things. She would pout,
and, when the dividend checks would come, she
would look at me nastily and throw them on the
kitchen table. "This is your stock," she would
say.
It is submitted that the only tenable determination
which can be made is that the property in question was
placed in joint tenancy under the mistaken belief of
Mr. Buck that plaintiff-appellant was his wife.

Facts similar to those in the Buck case, involving
a Mexico divorce and a mistaken gift, were developed
in the case of Wood v. Wood, 245 NYS 800, 826 and
41 Misc. 2d 95, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1259 (1963). The New
York court, at page 826, said:
The fourth counterclaim relates to the "joint
ownership" of the apartment. The defendant
bought the apartment on March 31, 1960 for
$165,000.00; on December 19, 1961, with the
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consent of the Landlord Corpora.tion (effective
January 1, 1962), he transferred the ownership
from himself to "Walter A. Wood and Helena
A. Wood, his wife, as joint tenants with right
of survivorship". The transfer was by way of
outright gift. The defendant, on the assumption
his marriage is annulled, asks to have the property restored to him. He does so on the ground
that the transfer was made in the belief that he
was validly married to the plaintiff; that he
otherwise would not have done so. I think he is
entitled to the relief he asks. It is unthinkable
that the gift would have been made, except for
a belief in a subsisting marriage. It was already
the matrimonial home; the plaintiff called it
"her home" at least during her lifetime without
any documents of title and it was only because
she was believed to be the wife, entitled to the
"security" of a wife, that the transfer was made.
To be sure the defendant did not say in so many
words that he would not have made the transfer
if he had not believed the plaintiff was legally
his wife. His assertion to that effect would not
be determinative; but the absence of a strict
formula here should not prejudice him. It was
not any statement by the plaintiff upon which
he relied in making the transfer. That was done
upon a mistaken belief as to his status. Both
believed the relationship to be that of husband
and wife; there was no fraud upon the part of
either one-but there were no equities in favor
of the wife such as existed in American Surety
Co. of New York v. Conner, 251 NY 1, 166 N.E.
783, 65 ALR 244.
POINT II. THE DISTRIBUTION IN
EQUITY MADE TO PLAINTIFF-APPEL·
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J,ANT IS EXCESSIVE AND NOT
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

SUP-

The principal question is what contributions to the
acquisition of the property 'Yere made by plaintiff and
<lef endant.
There is no question that defendant brought with
him, at the time of the purported marriage, assets
amounting to at Jeast $34,400.00 to $36,400.00. These
consisted of:
Rental property inherited from his mother situated
$14,400.00
in Long Beach California (Tr. 292)
Bonds from money inherited from his mother with
a face value of (Tr. 293)
15,000.00
Bank account consisting of income from rental property and other money deposited in the Farmers and
Merchants Bank, Long Beach, Celifornia
(Tr. 298)
4,000 to 6,000.00
Water bond from his inheritance (Tr. 298, 199)
1,000.00
$34,400 to $36,400.00
In the succeeding years of this association, from
1946 to 1963, the income from the rental property
m Long Beach amounted to another
27,371.26
\Tr. 295, 296. Ex. 15-D and income tax returns)
Bank interest and stock dividends accruing in the
succeeding years of the association added another
23,014. 76
I.Tr. 296, 297, Ex. 16-D)

$ 50,386.02

'Yhen the parties moved to Salt Lake City, defendant purchased a beer tavern with money from his inheritance (Tr. 302, 303). In addition, the defendant
pmchased a building lot for $700.00 in the early part
of 1947 with money from his inheritance (Tr. 300, 301).
In 1948 a residence was purchased, and the down pay-
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ment made consisted of $4,000.00 in bonds from his
mother's inheritance and the lot for which he received a
credit of $1,000.00 (Tr. 301, 302).
Thereafter, beginning in about 1954, defendant
began investing his money in corporate stocks. On page
305 of the transcript he says:
" ... I finally took all my savings out and
all my money in the safety deposit box tha:
wasn't working for me, and I put it aH in stock."
Under examination by plaintiff's counsel (Tr. 210) in
answer to the question of where the money to buy the
stocks came from, defendant said,
" . . . from income off the property in Cali·
fornia; from interest that I had in the banks;
I had money in the banks. I had money in differ·
ent banks. I had money in the Prudential Bank.
I had money in the Continental Bank that I had
spread around from my Long Beach property:
also the accumulation of interest; that is what
I bought the stocks with."
The defendant bought and traded the stocks (Tr. 306).
He was the manager and business head in the acquisi·
tion of the stock portfolio. Plaintiff admits he bought
and sold the stocks (Tr. 25). But in other testimony,
plaintiff says she purchased and sold various stocks
(Tr. 26). This last statement is categorically denied on
direct and cross-examination by witness Healy, the
account executive who handled all of defendant's stock
business (Tr. 438, 439).
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The realty on which the tavern business was conducted was purchased in 1963 for $34,500.00, and in
answer to the question, " ... and do you recall how the
money was put together to buy that?", defendant said:
"'Ve sold some stocks that was in both our
names. I sold some stock that was in my name,
and I also drew around $4,000.00 cash from
the bank in my name." (Tr. 302-304).
In 1957 a duplex was purchased for $5,500.00 cash,
and defendant said he had savings accounts sufficient
to make the purchase (Tr. 303).
The testimony of all the witnesses, it is submitted,
confirms two statements made by defendant - 1) on
examination by adverse counsel, viz.:
"I would never have had any of this stuff if
I hadn't had bonds to begin." (Tr. 241).
and 2) on direct examination:
" . . . we wouldn't have had anything if it
wasn't for the inheritance." (Tr. 345).

'VHAT 'VAS DEFENDANT'S CONTRIBUTION IN 'VORK AT THE BEER TAV-

ERN?

Defendant has operated the business from the
time it opened to the present and is yet operating it
(Tr. 308). From the opening of the business to the
present, defendant has worked a shift at the business
in addition to all the other duties which devolved upon
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him as the manager (Tr. 319) - the bookkeeping, the
maintenance, the janitor work, the gardening work,
purchasing. None of this testimony is denied, neither
directly nor inferentially.
The defendant testified that during the years l94ti
(the inception of the business) and 1953 he worked a!
the tavern as a bartender for at least forty hours :1
week, and in the performance of other duties connecteo
with the management of the enterprise at least thirt)
additional hours a week; that between the years 195i
and 1959 he spent at least thirty-two hours a week therr
as a bartender and thirty-five additional hours a wed;
in performance of his other duties; that between 195[1
and October 18, 1964, the date plaintiff left defendanl
(Tr. 317), he spent at least twenty-four hours a wee~
as a bartender and forty additional hours a week in tl1e
performance of his other duties; that from the 18th 01
October, 1964, to the time of the tiral he worked at tht
tavern as a bartender for thirty hours a week and ai
additional forty hours per week in performing his other
duties, which always consisted of keeping the books.
opening the business every day, pulling weeds, watering,
scrubbing the floors, painting, buying records for tht
juke box and putting them on, purchasing supplies,
keeping abreast of current business affairs to enablt
him to regulate his business, and checking on his em·
ployees to see what was going on (Tr. 325 through 3271
The defendant's testimony in this regard is confirmeil
by all the witnesses who were at the tavern throughout
the nineteen years of ten enough to know.
1
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.Mr. Sheridan, whose employment began in 1946,
sa~·s that :Mr. Buck worked regular shifts at that time,
and that plaintiff did not work on a regular basis (Tr.
395, 400), and that she was at the tavern more often as
u customer.
Again, Robert Gull, who was employed at the
tavern from 1958 to 1963, testified that Mr. Buck was
at the tavern every morning, and when the business
was without a day bartender, he would take his place;
that .Mr. Buck many times worked a full shift, and that
:Mr. Buck did not spend very much time away from
the Buckeroo (Tr. 419, 421). He also stated that the
work of plaintiff at the tavern was of no great extent,
and that the only time she worked was when she relieved
Mr. Buck (Tr. 419).
that,

'V"itness Thatcher stated, on cross-examination,
"It was l\'[r. Buck who took care of the whole
business, who did everything necessary to be
done,"

that "he was there all the time" (Tr. 405, 408). She also
testified that plaintiff was never there on a regular basis,
and that plaintiff was there more often as a customer
than as a worker (Tr. 405).
\Vitness Tolman, a frequent customer at the tavern,
testified that Mr. Buck was always there checking on
something (Tr. 444).
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NO,V, 'VHAT 'VAS PLAINTIFF'S COX.
TRIBUTION TO THE ACQUISITION OF
THE PROPERTY?
Plaintiff herself testified that at the time she and
Mr. Buck first came to Salt Lake City from California
she had no assets or other things of value, and during
the entire time she cohabited with Mr. Buck she had
no outside employment; that she was not paid any wage~
from anyone other than Mr. Buck; that she hadn't
received any money (other than from Mr. Buck) from
anyone else; and that she did not " ... invest any of (her)
own funds in any of the property" acquired by Mr.
Buck. Her answer was,

"NT one of my own f' un ds. " (T r. 40) .
She further stated, in answer to a question from her
counsel, that there was no co-mingling of her fund,
with those of :Mr. Buck prior to coming to Salt Lake
City (Tr. 39). She did attempt to establish that she
had $700 in cash in her purse when she arrived in Sall
Lake City. She later stated that she
" ... spent my money-what I had-on clothe~
and on-when we first came here, we just hao
the suitcase; . . . " (Tr. 70).
Shortly after their arrival in Salt Lake City, the
plaiutiff was hospitalized, and Mr. Buck paid the hos·
pital bills. He testified that she never told him abou!
this purported $700, not then or in all the years of thf
association ( Tr. 300) .
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THE PLAINTIFF HAVING MADE NO
CONTRIBUTION IN FUNDS TOWARD THE
ACQUISITION OF THE BUSINESS, THE
RESIDENCE, THE DUPLEX, THE STOCKS,
OR THE REALTY ON WHICH THE BUSINESS IS LOCATED, WHAT WAS HER CONTRIBUTION IN '¥ORK TOWARD THE ACQuISITION OF THE PROPERTY?
The trial court correctly found that the acquisition
of this property is almost entirely because of the efforts
and contributions of defendant, and that plaintiff had
nothing to do with the acquisition of, or reinvestment
of, the stocks; and that "Plaintiff's contribution toward
the properties acquired during the cohabitation in addition to well executed duties usually discharged by a
wife, amounted to help at the Buckeroo Lounge, but not
on a regular basis during the latter years of their
cohabitation" (Findings of Fact). It is submitted that
her work at the lounge was not on a regular basis at any
time.
'V"itness Sheridan, one of the first bartenders, stated
that the plaintiff didn't "pull a regular shift" in 1946;
that she had a bad effect on the customers when she
was there; that she was there more often as a customer
or visitor than as a worker and that she had a mean
disposition (Tr. 395-397) . This is from a witness who
worked for Mr. Buck in 1946 and has visited with Mr.
Buck only once or twice in the ensuing nineteen years.
This testimony is buttressed by that of other wit-
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nesses who worked at, and frequented the tavern, often
enough to make reliable observations. 'Vitness Gull
stated the plaintiff did very little work at the tavern.
and that she was mean and obnoxious when drunk
(Tr. 419, 425). The testimony is that the plaintiff wa 1
never there as a worker (Tr. 404); that she was mean
(Tr. 412) ; that she was vicious (Tr. 442) ; that she used
foul language (Tr. 452).
In addition, the testimony is that plaintiff was not
familiar enough with the operation of the tavern to
know the prices of the articles sold (Tr. 363) ; that she
never managed the place (Tr. 309). Mr. Buck's testi·
mony is that she came down and helped him out between
April and the first of July in 1946 - that she would
relieve him for a few hours, and that sometimes she
worked quite a few hours (Tr. 316). That between 1946
and 1953, the plaintiff averaged about twenty hours n
week; and between 1953 and 1959, plaintiff averaged
about ten hours a week at the tavern; and that from
1959 to October, 1964, when plaintiff left defendant
she would have averaged about five hours a week; and
never at any time was her work at the tavern on a regular
basis (Tr. 324, 325) .
The plaintiff attempted to show that the time slit
worked equaled that of Mr. Buck, and that "recently''
she had to work numerous times (Tr. 12, 13). The1~
she tried to show that her work at the tavern over tilt
years was more than that of Mr. Buck (Tr. 55).
The overwhelming 'veight of the evidence is againi:
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her, and it appears apparent that the Trial Judge, who
heard and saw her testify, did not believe her.
There is testimony to the effect that she was a good
cook and kept a good house. Certainly this was not a
difficult task in view of the fact that there were no children, no financial worries, and no one to care for but
herself and ~Ir. Buck. Even at that, she was not such a
good housewife as to get out of bed to prepare Mr.
Buck's breakfast (Tr. 53). Plaintiff did what she wanted
to (Tr. 388).

HO\V \VAS THE PLAINTIFF TREATED DURING THE NINETEEN YEARS OF
THE ASSOCIATION?
The direct testimony of her witness is:
"Mr. and Mrs. Buck lived well. They didn't
deny themselves any of the luxuries that they
obviously could afford. Mr. Buck had Cadillacs,
and he liked to make trips, and they had exactly
what they-to all appearances-had exactly
what they wished in their home; had a home
which was well taken care of inside and out, and
lived and ate and entertained, and, generally,
lived in a good fashion-in fine fashion." (Tr.
118).

The plaintiff's daughter testified that her mother
and Mr. Buck lived well; that her mother had been
well taken care of; that she had been supplied with food
and clothing, entertainment and trips above the average
that people have. That her mother received gifts of
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money from .Mr. Buck in the hundreds of dollars (Tr.
174, 175).

The plaintiff herself testified that any time she
asked Mr. Buck for money, he gave it to her; that he
gave her as much as $500 at a time, and that there were
other large sums he gave her, and that he gave her
money for clothes (Tr. 81). She also testified that in
the beginning he gave her $35 a week for householrl
expenses; that later on he gave her $50 a week; that
she didn't have to pay the utilities out of this money:
that there were just the two of them at home, and that
in addition to these sums she received other large sums.
and money any time she asked for it (Tr. 80, 81). ~Ir.
Buck's testimony is that the only time he ever refuser!
her was when she asked him for a mink coat. The clothe1
closets in plaintiff's home were full of her clothing
(Tr. 335).
His uncontradicted testimony is also that, except·
ing those times when her children stayed with them,
there were just the two of them at home; that they ate
well; that they went to plays that came to town, movies:
that he bought her a boat, golf clubs, bowling balls; that
throughout the period of their association he'd taken her
out to dinner at least once a week. His statement is:
" ... maybe, I missed a week, though, sol
would average it at least once a week, thougl:.
at the very least." (Tr. 334-337).
The plaintiff was also the beneficiary of a trip to
Europe via the Queen lVIary and return via air. Ir.
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addition to the trip to Europe, there were trips to
Mexico City, to Yancouver, Washington, "many times
to California to see her kids ... ",to Las Vegas, to Den1·er, to Reno, to San Francisco. Mr. Buck paid all
the expenses (Tr. 337, 338) . Plaintiff herself testified
they took trips to California "very frequently" (Tr. 60).
That he gave her other money in large amounts
is uncontradicted and corroborated. as is the fact that
he paid her hospital bills, her dental bills, her medicine
bills (Tr. 340, 341, 174, 175, 81).
Other witnesses testified that the plaintiff always
appeared to be well dressed, and that she never seemed
to lack for money (Tr. 406, 412, 419, 420, 425, 426).
THE
LANT.

BRIEF

OF

PLAINTIFF-APPEL-

Plaintiff argues that there is error in allowing
defendant $70,386.02 as a cash contribution. It is submitted that the testimony and the exhibits referred to
amply sustain the court's finding in this regard.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant should be
charged with the gambling losses. It is submitted that
the court correctly found that these balance out each
other, and the evidence is that plaintiff and her friends
accompanied him on most of the gambling trips; that
plaintiff gambled as much as he did, and throughout
the years of the association he had lost no more than
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$3,000 and that her losses equaled that figure (Tr. 358i.

In addition, there is ample testimony showing that jir,
Buck won large sums of money (Tr. 356, 180).

Plaintiff also claims defendant's share should bt
charged with the loss of the 1959 Cadillac. It is error
to do so in view that the Cadillacs were carried as:,
business expense and used as a front for the busine.1.1
The testimony at page 264 of the transcript is:
Q. During the marriage, Mr. Buck, you hare
bought many things that you liked yourself thal
were quite expensive items, such as Cadillac
automobiles, have you not?

A. That is business expense.
Q. \Vell, you have bought them because you
liked Cadillacs ?

A. I like business.

Q 'Vell, the Cadillac doesn't help your
does it?

busines~

A. It does.
Q. In what way?

A. It is a front.
Plaintiff's witness testified that because of the higl
cost of insurance premiums, Mr. Buck said he was u
self-insurer (Tr. 120).
1

In response to plaintiff's contention that it wa~
error on the part of the lower court to find that tbr
acquisition of the property is almost entirely because ol
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the efforts and contributions of the defendant, it is
~ubmitted that the e''idence, just that part of it alluded
to in this brief by transcript number, conclusively estabfo,hes that such is the case. In connection therewith, it
should be said in answer to plaintiff's statement on page
10 of her brief to the effect that nearly all the stocks
were purchased by moneys taken from the net profits
of the buisness, that it must be apparent from the evidence alluded to, as aforesaid, that nearly all the net
profits of the Buckeroo business were expended by
defendant for himself and plaintiff in financing the
many trips they took, the entertainment they had, the
above-average standard of living they enjoyed.
In answer to Point VII of plaintiff's brief with
respect to the value of the business, defendant directs
the court's attention to the testimony at pages 73, 7 4,
i350 and 351 of the transcript. Plaintiff-appellant there
testifies she didn't know anything about the purported
offer for the sale of the tavern. Her testimony is:

Q. . .. who made the offer for the purchase of
the Buckeroo?

A. I wasn't there. I was home. Mr. Buck told
me about it.

*

*

*

Q. Did you favor the sale of the Buckeroo-

A. Yes.

Q. -to Rey?
A. Did I what?
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Q. Did you favor the sale of the Buckeroo for

$50,000?

A. Yes; I asked Buck why he didn't take it.
Q. Did you know anything about Rey's credit.
rating?

A. No, he was in there quite often. He was
speaking of going into business, is all I know.
I don't know nothing-how would I know? No.
sir, I don't.

Q. Yet, you told

take it?

~Ir.

Buck to go ahead ana

A. 'Vell. he certainly would not have taken it
if the man hadn't had the money.

Q. So you really relied on Mr. Buck's judgment
as to what to do with it, didn't you?
A. 'Vell, yes: I would, definitely, in that case.
(Tr. 73-74
Mr. Buck testified:

Q. Calling your attention to an offer for !ht
purchase of the tavern which was referred !n
two or three days ago in the testimony - a1!
offer of $50,000-did you ever have a bona fidt
offer of $50,000 for the purchase of the tavern'
A. A bona fide offer?
Q. Yes; good-faith offer?

A. No.
Q. Do you have anv idea where this $50,00
offer ca~e from or h~w this arose-how the irle.
came about?

1
'

A. It was just frivolous talk.

* 32*

*

Q. Did he deposit any earnest money?

A. Not a penny.

*

*

*

Q. Did he ever come back and make further

offers to purchase it?

(Tr. 350-351)

A. No.

There seems to be no real question about the fact
that plaintiff did not have anything to do with the acquisition or reinvestment of the stocks. She stated none
of her own funds were invested in any of the property
(Tr. 40). That Mr. Buck bought the stocks (Tr. 25).
That testimony, together with that of Mr. Buck (Tr.
306) and that of Mr. Healy (Tr. 438, 439), should set
that matter at rest. That the great majority of the
money from the Buckeroo was used as living expenses
is sustained by testimony at pages 208, 209, 210 of the
transcript.
In answer to plaintiff's Point VIII, it is to be
noted that the total acquisition cost of the properties in
evidence amounted to $108,200.88 (Tr. 307). Of this
amount $70,385.92 has been traced to the assets and
business acumen of Mr. Buck. The difference, viz.
$37,815.96 came from the profits of the business (Tr.
328) (Exhibits 15-D, 16-D, and the income tax returns).
YVHAT PART OF THIS $37,000 IS
TRACEABLE TO
THE
EFFORTS
OF
PLAINTIFF - FOR SHE ~IADE NO MONETARY CONTRIBUTION?
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For, if plaintiff can recover at all, she will do so on
the value of her contribution in acquisitive effort. It ii
submitted that her efforts toward the acquisition ol
this money compared to the efforts of l\ir. Buck werr
small indeed.
Plaintiff makes a point that Exhibit 15-D show,
more of an income to defendant than do his income ta.\
returns. Plaintiff errs in not realizing that the deprecia·
tion on the Long Beach property, which served as a tai
deduction, would be a direct addition to the income, ana
it is submitted that 15-D accurately reflects the figure,
on the income tax returns. It is also to be noted tlrn'
the amount of money paid out by Mr. Buck for tnt
support of his son by a prior marriage was reflecteii
directly back into his income through a tax exemption.
(Income tax returns)
'Vith reference to the value of the business, lDt
testimony is that the license under which Mr. Bm:
operated and was operating at the time of the trial,,,,
not transferrable -he couldn't sell it; that he was fore~
to pay an exorbitant price for the real property in ordt
to stay in business ( Tr. 304 ) , and that the additior·
to the tavern were necessary. But in the final analysi
the business has no market value other than the red
property on which it stands; his beer license is not tram
ferrable (Tr. 317). In addition, there is no eviden11
that the automobile has a value of $7,800.00.
1

'Vith respect to the bank account of approximate]
$9,000.00, this was money which came to the defendau
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after plaintiff left him on October 8, 1964, and the court
found, and rightly so, that plaintiff had nothing whatever to do with the business after she left (Tr. 364,
Memorandum Decisions).
Plaintiff, in her Point V, makes some point about
the stocks being in joint tenancy. The plain answer to
that is that ~Ir. Buck thought the plaintiff was his
wife; that he was mistaken, and that he would not have
placed any property in joint tenancy but for the fact
that he did think the plaintiff was his wife, and to keep
peace at home (Tr. 342 through 344).
Plaintiff, at the trial and in her brief, made much of
defendant's drinking and attempted to show that defendant's drinking accounted for a great waste of assets.
The testimony does not support her attempt, and it appears apparent that the Trial Judge didn't believe her,
and I might add, the wise financial management with
which defendant made money does not countenance such
a claim. It is submitted that the following itself is a
complete answer to any such inflammatory claims. Under cross-examination, the defendant testified:
Q. 'Vho has made the purchases of the whiskey
that you have consumed?

A. I have.
Q. 'V ould you have an estimate as to how much
you have spent per week?

A. I couldn't even guess. "\Vhen you say "A
great deal of whiskey," now, there has been
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months and months and years that I haren'!
drank.
I have friends that, at the Elks Club, I wai
there eight years before they knew I took a drink.
I ordered one drink, and he says-my friewl
says, "I never knew you drank."
I have had bar-tenders that worked for me for
years without knowing I drank.

This is just a great exaggeration. If I dranl
a tenth as much booze as I have heard here in
Court, we wouldn't have this dough to argue
about.
I am not an alcoholic in that sense, at all.
but I have, a couple of times, through aggra·
vation and arguments with her, overdrank.

But that's been for a week; not for eight weeki
-and twice-not over-in nineteen years.
(Tr. 381-382:
'Vith reference to plaintiff-appellant's Point IX
and her proposed accounting, it appears that the on!:.
other observations about its accuracy that need be maa:
are:
'\Vhere does it show the earning power of Mr. Buck·
capital contribution, and where does it show that plai1
tiff-appellant made any contribution? Where does ir
show the relative contributions in acquisitive effort? Ho1
did plaintiff-appellant build this estate?
1
•

While accountings in matters such as these do no:
lend themselves to the precision of a mortgage note. tl
following accounting is offered as being commensura 11
11
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with the facts to a degree unattainable by either plaintiff-appellant's accounting or that of the lower court.

ACCOUNTING
1. Stocks

2. Business & Realty &

$107,435.00

Additions

3. Residence
4. Duplex

34,500.00
14.500.00
7,000.00

G. Additions to Buckeroo
6. Automobile
7. Bank account

0.00
4,000.00
74.00

8. Undeposited dividends

0.00

When plaintiff left this
is the amount that was
in the bank

Sa. Deposited dividends

$1,862.00, but came after
plaintiff's departure
9. Net income since Oct., 1964

Total Worth
Acquisition cost of all
assets
Funds contributed:
Defendant
Plaintiff
Funds attributable to
profits from business

0.00

(Tr. 304-317)
(Tr. 348, 349)
(Tr. 350)
J'fo reference on Tr. 237
See No. 2 supra
(Tr. 267) Only evidence
(Tr. 358) The money,
testified on Tr. 261,
came after plaintiff's
departure and she did
nothing toward its
acquisition
No evidence of this.
Plaintiff's reference to
Tr. 236 is error
(Tr. 258, 268)

Any income to which
plaintiff would have a
claim would be income
which she helped produce (Tr. 364)

$167,509.00

108,200.88

(Tr. 307)

70,386.01
0.00

(Tr. 328)

$ 37,815.87

What ratio does the contribution in funds by Mr.
Buck bear to the total acquisition cost?
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Defendant: 65%, or $70,386.01

Plaintiff: o.o;~

The plaintiff's contribution in acquisitive effort, if
any, is represented in a portion of the balance of $37,814.87, which is the remaining 35% of the acquisition
cost. What portion 1
Plaintiff: 17.4 % ------·--------- $ 6,579. 79
Defendant: 82.6% ------------·- $31,235.08
Mr. Buck testified (Tr. 325, 326, 327) as to tht
amount of work each put in at the tavern, and the cred1.
bility of this testimony is supported by that of othe1
witnesses (Tr. 395, 397, 399, 404, 408, 417, 419, 42f.
434, 442, 443, 444, 449, 450), and not discounted anywhere except by plaintiff when she said, in exaggeration
(it is suggested) that she worked more than Mr. Buel
(Tr. 55).
His testimony shows:
Plaintiff worked:
1946-53 about 20 hours per week
1953-59 about 10 hours per week
1959-64 about 5 hours per week
Total hours plaintiff worked: 35 hours
Defendant worked:
1946-53 about 70 hours per week
1953-59 about 67 hours per week
1959-64 about 64 hours per week
Total hours defendant worked: 201 hours
1964-66, again, 70 hours per week
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The ratio of plaintiff's effort at the tavern to that
of Mr. Buck's is 17.4% - applied to that portion of
the cost of acquisition not attributable to the contribution in money, and this assumes, to plaintiff's benefit,
that her effort was as productive as his, which, defendant
suggests, it certainly was not. It shows plaintiff's effort
produced $6,579. 79.
35
Plaintiff:
17.4%
- - equals .174
201
Defendant: 82.6%
Therefore, 65 % of the value of the assets is attributable to the money contribution of Mr. Buck alone,
and 35 3 of the value of the assets to the contribution
i.n effort of both parties.
Value of assets
Less 65% (attributable to Mr.
Buck's contribution in funds)

$167,509.00
108,870.85

35% in value of the assets purchased
from the profits of the business
$ 53,638.15
Plaintiff:
17 .47r of $58,638.15
Defendant: 82.6'7c of $68,638.15

$ 10,203.04
48,435.11
$ 58,638.15

RECAPITULATION
Total estate
Total estate attributable to money
contribution of Mr. Buck
$108 870 gr::0
Tot~! contribution in effort
'
·
attributable to Mr. Buck
48,435.11
Total effort and capital contribution of Mr. Buck
Total. est~te attributable to money
~ontnbutioi:i of. plaintiff-appellant
otal contribution in effort
attributable to plaintiff-appellant
rota! effort and capital contribu1on of plaintiff-appellant
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$167,509.00

157,305.96
0 00
.
1 0,203.04
10,203.04
$167,509.00

A salient fact to be considered in relation to the
acquisition of the property here in question is that of
l\'Ir. Buck's wise financial management (Tr. 301, 302,
363).

CONCLUSION
Toward the acquisition of the property, plaintiff.
appellant contributed no funds, and she contribute1J
relatively little effort. There were no children, and sht
kept house for herself and Mr. Buck. She was well·
maintained and liberally supplied with money and e11tertainment. She supplied no separate funds and did rn1
work at any outside employment.
Toward the acquisition of the property, .l\Ir. Buci
contributed funds amounting to $70,386.01, and he con·
tributed relatively large effort. There were no children
He managed the business and the investments and tool
care of the yard and house at the residence. Hem,
well-maintained and liberally supplied with money auL
entertainment through his own efforts and capital. H'
supplied separate funds and was the manager and cl11t:
worker in the business and the sole manager of ti::
investments.
Therefore, in view of the well-settled law in a
jurisdictions where the common law is the rule fr.:
decision, where the courts uniformly hold that an equ:
table division of the property acquired during a voii
marriage shall be made upon a determination of th
proportionate contributions of the parties thereto, an,
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that contributions are defined in terms of money and
acquisitiYe effort; it is submitted that the award to
plaintiff-appellant is an abuse of discretion, and exceeds
by more than $20,000 the amount to which she is equitably entitled.
Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant respectfully submits that this Honorable Court award to
Plaintiff-Appellant not more than the total sum of
$10,203.04, without interest, and that it quiet title to
the remaining property in him.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant
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